These six documents,
originally revealed at Raw
Story, with authenticity confirmed by
NBC news,
show pre-war concerns of the British government regarding the planned
invasion and what would happen after Saddam is removed from power.
As Raw Story reports, they
"reveal the
depth and breadth of the plan to go to war and the extent of the deceit on
the part of the President and his cabinet, in conjunction with the Blair
government".
1. "Iraq Options
Paper," UK Overseas and Defense Secretariat, March 8, 2002
The greater investment of Western forces, the greater our control over
Iraq's future, but the greater the cost and the longer we would need to
stay. The only certain means to remove Saddam and his elite is to invade and
impose a new government, but this could involve nation building over many
years. Even a representative government could seek to acquire WMD and
build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and Israel retain their
WMD and conventional armouries and there was no acceptable solution to the
Palestinian grievances.
SIGNIFICANCE: UK government anticipated "nation building over many
years," in contradiction to public case by Bush administration. British also
believed Iraq might acquire WMD without Saddam Hussein in power.
We have looked
at three options for regime change...
OPTION 3: A GROUND CAMPAIGN
The aim would be to launch a full-scale ground offensive... A pro-Western
regime would be installed... The optimal times to start action are early
spring.
SIGNIFICANCE: Timing of invasion already set in March 2002. Aim is not an
Iraq which can democratically choose its policies, but a "pro-Western
regime."
"Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western stooges."
SIGNIFICANCE: The head of the INC (Iraqi National Congress) was Ahmed
Chalabi; Chalabi is now acting Oil Minister of Iraq. The head of the INA
(Iraqi National Accord) was Ayad Allawi; Allawi was Prime Minister of the
Iraqi Interim government from June 1, 2004-April 7, 2005.
See Full Text: Iraq Options Paper
PDF Document
2. "Iraq: Legal Background," UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, March 8, 2002
The US... maintain that the assessment of breach [of UN resolutions] is for
individual member States. We are not aware of any other State which supports
this view.
SIGNIFICANCE: Bush administration's interpretation of international law,
which eventually invoked for the invasion, was so bizarre it was not shared
by any other nation on earth (including UK).
Full Text: Iraq Legal
Background
3. Memo from David Manning (Foreign Policy Advisor to Blair) to
Blair on Manning's Dinner with Condoleezza Rice, March 14, 2002
I said you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to
manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion... Condi's enthusiasm for
regime change is undimmed.... Bush has yet to find the answers to the big
questions:... what happens on the morning after?
SIGNIFICANCE: Aim was always regime change. Bush had no plan for future of
Iraq.
Full Text: Manning Letter to the Prime
Minister on dinner with Condoleezza Rice
4. Memo from Christopher Meyer (UK Ambassador to US) to David Manning
on Meyer's lunch with Wolfowitz, March 18, 2002
"On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with
Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever
and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically,
and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it
wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy
for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went through
the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs and the
critical importance of the MEPP as an integral part of the anti-Saddam
strategy. If all this could be accomplished skillfully, we were fairly
confident that a number of countries would come on board."
SIGNIFICANCE: UN process was a sham for Blair's sake; aim was not
disarmament but regime change, which had already been decided on.
Full Text: Note on Sunday lunch with Paul
Wolfowitz, to David Manning
5. Memo from Peter Ricketts (Political Director, UK Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) to Jack Straw (UK Foreign Secretary), March 22, 2002
For Iraq, "regime change" does not stack up. It sounds like a grudge between
Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have suggested, to make the objective
ending the threat to the international community from Iraqi WMD...
SIGNIFICANCE: Aim was regime change, but that wouldn't sell; WMD issue was
useful for PR reasons.
US scrambling to establish a link between Iraq and Al [Q]aida is so far
frankly unconvincing.
SIGNIFICANCE: Even UK government at the highest levels believed the Bush
administration claims of an Iraq-Al Qaida links were false.
Full Text: Ricketts Memo to Jack Straw
6. Memo from Jack Straw to Blair, March 25, 2002
We have also to answer the big question—what will this action achieve?...
[no US assessment] has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to
be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime
will be better.
SIGNIFICANCE: UK government at its highest levels did not believe the US had
any plan to be certain a new Iraqi government would be an improvement on
Saddam and would not develop WMD.
Full Text:
Jack Straw Letter to Prime
Minister